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Abstract: When contracting parties adopt relational contracting (RC) as opposed to formal 
contracting stance, the construction project may achieve good outcomes. However, public projects 
usually face more constraints in adopting RC, as close relationships may lead to allegations of 
corruption. The aim of this study is to undertake a comparative analysis of drivers and barriers to 
adopting RC practices in public construction projects in two different markets viz. a centrally 
planned economy and a free market economy by investigating practices in Beijing and Sydney. The 
survey research design was adopted and data of public construction projects in Beijing and Sydney 
were collected using a structured questionnaire. The results revealed that relationship quality and 
level of harmony among contracting parties are significantly good in both cities. In Sydney, the level 
of inter-personal relations between contractors and consultants is significantly higher than in Beijing. 
It was found that the same 18 factors drive contracting parties in Beijing and Sydney to adopt RC 
practices, and in 6 instances, these are significantly greater drivers in Sydney. The barriers to 
adopting RC practices are totally dissimilar in both cities. Contracting parties in Beijing could not 
adopt more RC practices because of a lack of training in relational arrangement and public clients 
lack initiative in adopting RC practices. The conservative industry culture that encourages 
preservation of the status quo is also prevalent in Beijing. In Sydney, the only significant barrier is 
public sector accountability concerns. To cultivate readiness to embrace RC practices, it is suggested 
that industry professionals and the government adopt recommendations highlighted in this study 
according to the type of market structure. 
 




In the construction industry, the practice of adopting adversarial contracting approaches and the 
pursuit of individual company gain have produced a less efficient industry with criticisms relating to 
low productivity and innovation (Egan, 1998; Kumaraswamy et al., 2010). The poor delivery of 
clients' objectives has been traced to the incompetence of stakeholders to engage cooperatively 
(Colledge, 2005). Cooperative engagements suggest that parties need to develop close relationships. 
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Relationships between multiple project team members can be based on formal contractual liaisons, 
relational links or a combination of each. In a formal contract, parties usually act in an atomized 
manner, looking out for their own personal interests (Williamson, 1975). On the other hand, 
relational contracting (RC) embraces and underpins different approaches that establish working 
relationships between the parties aimed at win–win situations for all (Sanders and Moore, 1992). RC 
allows mutual future planning and considers contracts to be relationships among the parties, in the 
process of projecting the exchange into the future (Macneil, 1974). RC practices such as 
collaborative working arrangements are expected to be adoptable in private sector projects. 
 
On the one hand, contracting parties in public sector projects need to maintain arm's length 
relationship with each other to avoid allegations of corruption. Moreover, public projects are usually 
procured through a competitive bidding process and thus public clients have lesser rights to offer 
future relationships to contractors. On the other hand, greater adoption of RC practices is beneficial 
as it leads to better project outcomes (Ling and Tran, 2012). Research is therefore needed to find 
ways to increase the usage of RC, and remove the obstacles to the adoption of RC practices in public 
projects. 
 
The aim of this study is to undertake a comparative analysis of drivers and barriers to adopting RC 
practices in public construction projects in a centrally planned market and a free market economy 
represented by Beijing and Sydney respectively. The specific objectives are to: identify relationship 
quality among contracting parties; investigate if there is significant difference in relationship quality 
in both markets; identify significant differences in drivers and barriers to adopting RC practices in 
the two markets; and offer recommendations on how to increase adoption of RC practices in the two 
different markets. 
 
International architectural, engineering or construction (A/E/C) firms would be interested in China 
(represented by Beijing in this study) because it is the world's second largest economy and its 
construction industry has achieved healthy growth and development in the recent years (Tai et al., 
2009), making it a likely market destination for international A/E/C firms. Non-Chinese international 
A/E/C firms with the intention to enter China's construction market are likely to be familiar with an 
open market economy. To inform them of how different it would be to operate in China, Australia 
(represented by Sydney) was used to contrast the findings from China because it has a free market 
economy. 
 
As both China and Australia are large countries in terms of geographical spread, Beijing and Sydney 
were selected for in depth study. Beijing was chosen because it is China's capital and is the epitome 
of a centrally planned economy. Sydney was chosen to represent a free Western market economy. 
 
The comparative study between Beijing and Sydney may inform A/E/C firms of how different types 
of markets shape the motivating and impeding factors that influence RC adoption in public projects. 
With knowledge of the specific drivers and barriers in different markets, A/E/C firms may be able to 




Yeung et al. (2012) differentiated between relational contracting (RC) and relational contract. RC is 
a philosophy or a set of principles that are adopted in a contract. RC is defined as the working 
relationships among the parties who do not often follow the legal mechanism offered by the written 
contracts, and instead govern the transactions themselves within mutually acceptable social 
guidelines (Macaulay, 1963). RC focuses on trust and partnership (Colledge, 2005). Rahman and 
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Kumaraswamy (2004, 2005) found that RC provides the means to sustain ongoing relations in long 
and complex contracts by adjustment processes of a more thoroughly transaction-specific, 
continuous and administrative kind. Some examples of RC practices include having flexibility when 
situations change, compromising on unclear issues, sharing project information and solving problems 
jointly. 
 
Relational contract is a contract containing elements of RC (Yeung et al., 2012). The types of 
relational contracts include project partnering (CII, 1991), strategic partnering (Bennett and Jayes, 
1998), project and strategic alliances (Walker et al., 2002), public private partnership and joint 
ventures (Palaneeswaran et al., 2003). It is a set of contracting principles that provides an alternative 
for people carrying out transactions to cooperate and implement specific measures in the contract 
especially in times of uncertainty and complexity (Macneil, 1974). A relational contract is a sub-set 
of RC practices.  
 
This study focuses on the drivers and barriers to adopting RC practices in public projects in China 
and Australia, represented by Beijing and Sydney respectively. 
 
3. Market structures of China and Australia 
 
China maintains a centrally planned economy, also called authoritarian capitalism (McGregor, 2012) 
where the state directs and controls a large share of the country's economic output. The Chinese 
government usually controls and assigns construction works to nominated construction enterprises in 
its centrally planned economy (Liu and Low, 2007) through administrative orders (Zhang, 2003). 
 
Australia operates a free market economy. Individual consumers and businesses act in their own 
rational interests while producers produce what consumers need and want (Bollen, 2007). Its 
government has a policy of laissez-faire, where there are not many laws and regulations to control 
businesses. The open market competition in Australia encourages economic benefits in its building 
and construction industry, which plays a significant role in the economic prosperity of the country 
(Nitschke, 2010). 
 
The economies of China and Australia present two poles, and hence a comparative study of the 
drivers and barriers to adopting RC practises could inform A/E/C firms of unique challenges when 
operating in different markets. 
 
4. Drivers for adopting RC practices 
 
The motivating factors that may lead to the adoption of RC practices were identified through 
literature review. They are classified into 5 constructs and are reviewed below. 
 
4.1. Better cost outcome 
 
Studies have shown that desiring better cost outcome drives the adoption of RC. Better cost outcome 
involves the reduction of: total project cost; cost of changing partners; and risks. Reducing total 
project cost can be achieved by cooperating with partners to share development costs and 
technologies (Akintoye and Main, 2007). Better cost outcome is achieved when risk sharing between 
partners takes place (Black et al., 2000; Li et al., 2001; Ross, 2003). The shift to medium and long-
term relationships between contracting parties reduces the costs of developing new relationships. 
With the aid of a relational contract such as partnering, smaller construction firms can combine 
resources thereby maximizing resource utilization (Black et al., 2000). 
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4.2. Better time outcome 
 
Studies have shown that desiring better time outcome drives the adoption of RC. Better time 
outcome entails the reduction of project delivery time and public client's administration burden. 
According to Lu and Yan (2007), one of the incentives of relational contract is the ability to exercise 
better time control through better scheduling, more timely decisions and reliable programming. 
Additionally, unnecessary administration procedures may be avoided in partnering contracts (Chan et 
al., 2003). 
 
4.3. Better quality 
 
Desiring better quality may drive parties to adopt RC practices. Contracting parties adopt RC to 
experience improvement in quality and reduction in engineering rework (Chan et al., 2003).  
 
Improvement in design may drive parties to adopt RC (Black et al., 2000). In a partnered project, 
parties involved will take on joint responsibility to ensure a safe working environment, leading to a 
reduction in hazardous working conditions and accidents (Chan et al., 2003). 
 
4.4. Increased satisfaction 
 
Contracting parties may be driven to adopt RC practices because they desire increased satisfaction. 
Increased satisfaction comes about through a cooperative working environment which provides 
effective resolution of problems or conflicts and maintenance of harmony (Lu and Yan, 2007). 
 
Firms adopting relational contracts are better able to anticipate potential problems and subsequently 
develop an action plan focusing on methods as well as solutions (Chan et al., 2003). Ali et al. (2010) 
found that parties in relational contracts learn from one another to improve problem-solving skills. 
 
Parties may adopt RC because they are driven to build closer relationships with each other. Long-
term relationships that are formed with public clients benefit the clients' businesses and performance 
of other parties (Swan and Khalfan, 2007). Responding to public, social and end-users' needs may 
drive parties to adopt RC practices because of the importance of providing quality services to 
customers (end-users) (Lu and Yan, 2007). 
 
4.5. Increased competitiveness 
 
The need to increase competitiveness may drive contracting parties to adopt RC practices (Lummus 
et al., 1998). Black et al. (2000) stressed that organizations cannot survive in a market that is 
becoming increasingly competitive without the support of their suppliers. 
 
Relational contract in the form of strategic partnering increases organizational competency because it 
can be used to obtain and sustain a competitive advantage in the marketplace (Lu and Yan, 2007). 
Humphreys et al. (2003) found that strategic partnering allows several firms to work together on a 
long-term basis to undertake more than one project. Chan et al. (2003) concluded that collaborating 
provides the opportunity for all parties to achieve continuous improvement. Firms may also be 





5. Barriers to adopting RC practices 
 
The barriers to adopting RC practices are reviewed and classified into 5 constructs. These are 
discussed below. 
 
5.1. Lack of experience/knowledge in RC 
 
The lack of experience or knowledge in RC can impede the adoption of RC practices. Kumaraswamy 
et al. (2005) found that clients' lack of knowledge of relational approaches significantly deters the 
implementation of RC and the formation of a project-based integrated team. They argued that 
commitment from clients is imperative as they can more effectively drive the team building process 
as the project sponsor. 
 
Ng et al. (2002) found that the lack of training and guidance in RC affected the attainment of project 
goals. Moreover, when parties have past negative experience of relational arrangement, it is difficult 
for them to adopt RC practices again (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002). Lastly, the lack of experience in 
relational arrangement poses a barrier to implementing RC due to a lack of understanding on how it 
works (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002). 
 
5.2. Misalignment among project participants 
 
A misalignment among project participants may impede the adoption of RC. Eriksson et al. (2008) 
reported that not all organizations have the will and ability to cooperate with other parties and their 
unenthusiastic participation is a common barrier to adopting relational approaches. 
 
Akintoye et al. (2000) found that a lack of senior management support contributes to the failure of 
collaboration in construction projects. Lack of top management support may discourage individual 
decision makers from seeking new and more effective RC approaches (Eriksson et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, the lack of client's initiative in implementing RC practices dissuades other parties from 
adopting it (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008). 
 
The lack of common goals among contracting parties may be a barrier to implementing RC (Drexler 
and Larson, 2000). Packham et al. (2003) found that many problems arise because of different 
definitions of project goals. Drexler and Larson (2000) also pointed out that it is necessary to 
recognize that parties should work toward the same goals and need each other to achieve them. 
 
5.3. Adversarial environment 
 
The antagonistic culture and incompatible personalities between parties (Kumaraswamy et al., 2005) 
engender adversarial environment which impedes the adoption of RC. Contracting parties are used to 
working in opposition to each other to achieve their own objectives (Eriksson et al., 2008). The 
adversarial “win–lose” attitude exists due to a lack of trust among contracting parties (Ng et al., 
2002).  
 
Another barrier to RC adoption is the presence of opportunistic behaviors due to commercial 
pressures, absence of risk-reward plans and cultural clash at individual levels (Ke et al., 2011). The 
persisting adversarial setting deters contracting parties from adopting RC and instead may cause 
them to behave opportunistically (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008).  
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Incompatible culture at organizational and inter-personal levels may deter parties from adopting RC 
practices. Incompatible organizational cultures among contracting parties arise due to short-term 
focus on single projects (Eriksson et al., 2009). Inter-personal cultural clash may take place among 
project team members because they are of different nationalities (Hofstede, 2012). 
 
5.4. Cost and time to conduct RC 
 
The additional cost and time needed to conduct RC may impede its adoption. A substantial amount 
of cost may be needed to establish and maintain relational approaches (Ross, 2003). Cost may be 
incurred in cultural management which includes activities such as coaching and workshops (Ross, 
2003). Bresnen and Marshall (2000) found that organizations need to spend additional cost to change 
their systems to facilitate open communication and information sharing between partner 
organizations. 
 
To have successful relational contracts, a considerable amount of time is needed to find the right 
partners and develop the partnership (Cook and Hancher, 1990). Time is required to set up partnering 
charters and dispute resolution mechanisms, conduct team bonding exercises and workshops 
(Bresnen and Marshall, 2000). 
 
5.5. Uniqueness of public projects 
 
The uniqueness of public projects may be a barrier to adopting RC. Palaneeswaran and 
Kumaraswamy (2000) observed that clients, especially in the public sector, showed great reluctance 
to adopt changes and innovations as beliefs such as “there is no need to change current 
approaches/practices that are good enough” or a “not invented here” syndrome, do exist. 
Conservatism and inflexibility are barriers to RC since they hamper team work (Ng et al., 2002). 
 
Parties adopting RC may project their current exchange into the future (Macneil, 1974). However, 
contracting parties have misgivings about future relationships because fresh tenders need to be called 
for each new public project (Drexler and Larson, 2000). The need to call fresh tenders is because the 
public sector needs to maintain transparency to avoid allegations of corruption, and it needs to be 
accountable to tax payers (Ke et al., 2013). The need for transparency and accountability leads to the 
enactment of stringent rules, regulations and laws. 
 
6. Gap in knowledge 
 
The literature review revealed the drivers and barriers to adopting RC practices in general without 
distinguishing between: public and private construction projects; and planned and free market 
economies. Public sector clients are usually restrained from offering future relationship incentives 
because of the need to go through competitive bidding process in the procurement of contractors and 
consultants' services. Furthermore, the use of taxpayers' money in public projects makes it politically 
expedient to award contracts to the lowest bidder. In a centrally planned economy, the government 
dictates or controls the project implementers, while in a free economy, the most efficient players are 
appointed to develop public projects.  
 
The gap in knowledge is that it is not known if the drivers and barriers apply equally to public sector 
construction projects in a centrally planned economy and an open market economy. This study aimed 
to fill the knowledge gap by exploring and comparing the drivers and barriers to adopting RC 
practices in public projects in a centrally planned economy and an open market economy. 
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7. Research method 
 
7.1. Research design 
 
A large research project was undertaken to investigate the drivers and barriers, and RC practices 
adopted in public construction projects in Beijing, Hong Kong, Singapore and Sydney. Using the 
survey research design, questionnaire surveys were conducted between June and November 2011 in 
these cities. The respondents were requested to provide data of a completed public sector project that 
they had been previously involved in. This paper reports on a part of the study, focusing on 
relationship quality among contracting parties and the driving and impeding factors for adopting RC 
practices in Beijing and Sydney. 
 
Data were collected using a specially designed structured questionnaire. Section A requested 
information of a completed public sector construction project. Section B requested respondents to 
rate the relationship quality among contracting parties, on a 5-point scale, where: 1 = very bad; 3 = 
neutral; and 5 = very good. Sections C and D requested respondents to rate the extent to which they 
agreed with the drivers and barriers to adopt RC in the public project respectively. A 5-point scale 
was used where: 1 = strongly disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; and 5 = strongly agree. 
Section E investigated the RC practices adopted, but the results are reported elsewhere. A final 
section requested for the demographic characteristics of respondents and their companies. For the 
fieldwork in Beijing, the questionnaire was translated into Chinese. 
 
Content validity was addressed during the questionnaire development stage by an in-depth literature 
review and a pilot test of the questionnaire with 9 industry practitioners.  
 
The population comprised public sector construction projects in China and Australia. The total gross 
output value of state-owned construction for China in 2011 was RMB 2.078 trillion (≈US$ 335 
billion) (National Bureau of Statistics China, 2012). The value of public sector construction work 
done in 2010–2011 in Australia was A$48 billion (≈US$ 50 billion) (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2012). The sampling frame is projects in Beijing and Sydney. Ideally, public officers 
should be approached to fill up the information of completed public project that were under their 
charge. This was not done because the response rate would be dismal. A research decision was made 
to approach multiple parties (public officials, contractors and consultants) who had been involved in 
public construction projects in these cities to provide information of completed public projects. To 
avoid repetitions in the data set, upon receiving a completed set of questionnaire, the characteristics 
of the project (section A) were checked to confirm that different respondents did not provide 
information of the same project. 
 
The names and contact details of public officials were obtained from government directories. As the 
number of people in this group was not overwhelming, questionnaires were sent to all identified 
relevant public officials. The consultants and contractors were identified from their respective 
professional and trade institutions. Random sampling was used to select them. As this group may 
contain those who have not handled public projects, the questionnaire clearly stated that only those 
who had completed public projects should fill it up. 
 
7.2. Data analysis methodology 
 
There are many debates about whether Likert-scale data can be subjected to parametric statistical 
tests. Previous studies have found that the results from parametric tests with ordinal data are 
reasonably reliable (e.g., Carifio and Perla, 2008; Norman, 2011; Winter and Dodou, 2010). 
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Compared to parametric methods, Winn and Johnson (1978:358) considered nonparametric methods 
are only “better than doing no statistical analysis at all”. Armstrong (1980:62) stated that the 
opposition to the use of parametric statistics with ordinal data is “not sound theoretically, not 
necessary empirically and can have negative consequences if needlessly followed”. Zumbo and 
Zimmerman (1993:390) stated that “there is no need to replace parametric statistical tests by 
nonparametric methods when the scale of measurement is ordinal and not interval”, and Norman 
(2011) proposed that the controversy can cease. This study therefore conducted parametric statistical 
tests such as One-sample T-test and Independent Sample T-test using the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) software. The significance level for the tests was set at 0.05. 
 
One-Sample T-test was conducted to find out the strength of relationship quality and identify 
significant drivers and barriers in Beijing and Sydney separately. The test value was set at 3, which is 
the mean of a 5-point Likert scale. When p < 0.05 and the T-value are positive, it is concluded that 
there is significantly good relationship quality among contracting parties or there is significant 
agreement that a factor drives or impedes the adoption of RC practices in public projects. 
 
The Independent Sample T-Test is used to determine whether there is a significant difference in the 
means of two independent samples. It was applied to compare whether there are significant 
differences in relationship quality, drivers and barriers between Beijing and Sydney samples. If p < 
0.05, it indicates that respondents in Beijing and Sydney have rated significantly differently. 
 
8. Characteristics of the sample 
 
Questionnaires were sent to 259 and 322 samples in Beijing and Sydney respectively. 59 and 30 
valid questionnaires were returned in Beijing and Sydney representing response rates of 22.8% and 
9.3% respectively. The response rate for Beijing is adequate but low for Sydney. Although the 
response rates are relatively low, statistical analysis could still be performed because in accordance 
with the generally accepted rule, central limit theorem holds true when the sample size is no less than 
30 (Ott and Longnecker, 2001). 
 
Cronbach's alpha reliability test was conducted to examine internal reliability of the data sets. The 
Cronbach's alpha values were 0.868 and 0.864 for drivers and barriers respectively for the Beijing 
data set. In the Sydney data set, the Cronbach's alpha values of drivers and barriers were 0.891 and 
0.966 respectively. As these values are greater than 0.7, it suggests that the data are reliable and 
further statistical analyses may be conducted (Nunnally, 1978). 
 
The characteristics of the respondents are given in Table 1. Beijing and Sydney respondents have an 
average of 11 and 24 years of experience respectively. The respondents' firms engaged an average of 
19,934 and 7037 employees in Beijing and Sydney respectively. The respondents represent various 





9. Results and discussion 
 
9.1. Relationship quality among contracting parties in Beijing and Sydney 
 
The first objective of this study was to evaluate the relationship quality among contracting parties. 
Table 2 shows that relationship quality among contracting parties is significantly good (positive T-
values and p < 0.05) in all aspects (B1 to B7) in both cities. This indicates that in a centrally planned 
economy (Beijing) or an open market economy (Sydney): there is significant harmony during the 
project (B1); relationships among clients, consultants and contractors at the end of project are 
significantly good (B2 to B4); and the inter-personal relations among contracting parties are 
significantly good (B5 to B7). The implication is that regardless of the market structure, contracting 
parties adapt to get along with each other. The results support Smyth and Edkins' (2007) finding that 
the management of relationship is the responsibility of individuals for any one relationship. 
 
The second objective was to investigate if there is significant difference in relationship quality in 
both cities. The results in Table 2 show that there is generally no significant difference in B1 to B6 
type of relationship quality in Beijing and Shanghai. The only significant difference is item B7. The 
result shows significantly better inter-personal relations between contractors and consultants in 
Sydney than in Beijing. Contractors in China are often responsible for construction risks, costs and 
schedule while consultants take responsibility for the project quality. The demarcation of 
responsibilities may have caused tensions between contractors and consultants in China (Lu and Yan, 
2007). In addition, as the size of Beijing's construction market is much larger than Sydney, 
contractors and consultants in Beijing may be less familiar with each other hence lower level of 
inter-personal relations between them. The result concurs with Martinsuo and Ahola's (2010) finding 





9.2. Drivers of RC in Beijing and Sydney 
 
Identifying significant differences in drivers and barriers to adopting RC in Beijing and Sydney was 





Table 3 shows that there is no significant difference in 14 of the factors that drive the adoption of RC 
practices in Beijing and Sydney. This indicates that in many instances, the drivers of RC are similar 
in both centrally planned economy (Beijing) and open market economy (Sydney). The discussion 
below focuses on significantly different drivers. 
 
While contracting parties in both cities are driven to adopt RC practices in order to reduce the time 
needed to deliver projects (C4), those in Beijing are significantly less driven by this factor than those 
in Sydney. The Chinese government strongly emphasizes timely completion of public projects (Liu 
et al., 2010), and centrally approves construction projects above US$30,000,000 (Wang et al., 2000). 
The strict schedule control by the government supplants informal means such as RC practices to 
reduce the time needed to deliver public projects. Contracting parties in Beijing may therefore rely 
less on RC practices to reduce the time needed to deliver projects because the project duration is, to a 
large extent, under by the government's formal control. 
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Table 3 shows that reduction in public client's administration burden (C5) is a significant driver of 
RC adoption in Sydney but not in Beijing. This is consistent with Beijing's centrally controlled 
market structure where the government actively controls the market (Liu et al., 2010), sees this as its 
administrative duty, and hence contracting parties do not see reduction in public client's 
administration burden as a driver to adopt RC practices. 
 
While contracting parties in both cities regard factors C7, C8 and C11 as significant drivers of RC, 
Table 3 shows that those in Beijing are significantly less driven than those in Sydney to adopt RC 
because of the need to improve design (C8) and project quality (C7), and facilitate creative and 
innovative approaches (C11). A/E/C firms in Sydney strive to offer better design, higher quality and 
innovative output because they are operating in Australia's competitive environment. Indeed, 
Australia's competitiveness is ranked 20th as compared to China's 29th out of 144 countries (World 
Economic Forum, 2012). Conversely, Chinese A/E/C firms are less innovative, as attested by the low 
contribution rate of science and technology in its construction industry (Lu et al., 2008). There is also 
reluctance to evaluate advanced technology for its applicability in improving quality performance of 
construction projects (Dong, 2009). 
 
Project participants in both Beijing and Sydney are significantly driven to adopt RC practices 
because of the need to reduce disputes during the project (C14) and build up closer relationships with 
other contracting parties (C15). However, Table 3 shows that Australians are significantly more 
driven than the Chinese in these aspects. One possible explanation is that the Chinese have always 
emphasized on guanxi (relationship or connection) as a way of life (Gellerstam and Wiesner, 2010) 
and do not need structured RC practices to achieve this. China and Australia's individualism indices 
are 20 and 90 respectively (Hofstede, 2012) suggesting significantly higher collectivism in China. In 
the collectivistic Chinese culture, it is believed that building trust and maintaining good relationships 
with business counterparts will bring many long-term benefits. Australians who have significantly 
higher individualism may need to consciously adopt RC practices to engender a collaborative 
working environment (Luo, 2007).  
 
While contracting parties in both cities are significantly driven to adopt RC practices because of the 
need to respond to competitors' actions (C20) and seize new market opportunities (C18), 
practitioners in Beijing are driven to a significantly larger extent than those in Sydney. This is 
consistent with China's A/E/C firms that look for new markets in order to become globally 
competitive (Liu and Low, 2007). In Australia however, A/E/C firms increase their competitiveness 
progressively through applied research and innovation (Hampson and Brandon, 2004), and less 
through RC practices. 
 
9.3. Barriers to adopting RC in Beijing and Sydney 
 
The results in Table 4 show that Beijing respondents face 6 significant barriers to adopting RC while 
Sydney has only 1 barrier. The dissimilarity of barriers shows the unique problems faced by a 
centrally planned economy (Beijing) and an open market economy (Sydney) when trying to adopt 
RC practices. The discussion below highlights significant differences and offers recommendations on 





The lack of training and guidance in relational arrangement (D3) and lack of client's initiative in 
implementing RC practices (D11) significantly deter contracting parties in Beijing from adopting RC 
practices, but not in Sydney (see Table 4). This may be because relational contract is relatively new 
in China (Ke et al., 2013), while it is well established in Australia. The Chinese may be unable to see 
a ‘win–win’ scenario when adopting RC (Yeung et al., 2012), hence the lack of enthusiasm and 
initiative. For contracting parties in China to be better equipped with RC related knowledge, it is 
suggested that information relating to research findings and benchmarking studies be distributed and 
benefits of RC be promoted to them. 
 
It is recommended that the Chinese government, which forms the top management, provides 
leadership to implement RC. This is because top management plays a vital role in developing and 
maintaining relationships (Rowlinson and Cheung, 2005). 
 
The lack of empowerment in clients' representatives (D8) and the conservative industry culture that 
preserves the status quo (D18) significantly deter contracting parties in Beijing from adopting RC but 
not in Sydney (see Table 4). Chinese public clients may behave in this manner because they are 
infrequent or “one-off” clients and therefore lack interest in sustaining long-term relationships due to 
their short-term focus (Ke et al., 2011). Furthermore, clients are unwilling to empower their 
representatives because of their reluctance to break away from their traditional hierarchical position 
of control in their organizations. Australians on the other hand adopt an egalitarian attitude (Liang 
and Whiteley, 2003) rather than follow the hierarchical system like the Chinese. Thus Australian 
public clients can more easily empowered their representatives to make decisions. 
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It is not easy for public clients in China to change their mindset about distribution of power due to 
the high power distance, where the society accepts the hierarchical order and people do not strive to 
equalize the distribution of power (Hofstede, 2012). It is suggested that public clients employ highly 
competent professionals to be their representatives. This way, they could trust the representative to 
execute their duties competently and in time, may be able to empower them.  
 
The Chinese are significantly more deterred to adopt RC practices than Australians due to misgiving 
about potential future relationships (D7). In a market populated by a large number of A/E/C firms, 
Beijing respondents may have felt that there is only a slim chance to work together again in future 
projects which are procured through open tenders. Hence, there is a low potential to have future 
relationships with the same contracting parties in the current project. On the other hand, Australia's 
procurement system has developed beyond open tenders, and has other arrangements like alliance 
contracts (Rowlinson and Cheung, 2005) and serial contracts. These procurement methods allow 
current relationships in one project to be extended to the next, making future collaborations highly 
possible. It is suggested that the Chinese government consider alliance and serial contracting so that 
good performing A/E/C firms could be provided with longer runs of work, and longer term 
relationships can be nurtured. The use of cooperative procurement procedures should be considered 
as they give rise to better project performance (Eriksson and Westerberg, 2011). 
 
Beijing respondents are significantly deterred from adopting RC because of the extra time required to 
develop relationships (D22). Indeed in China, developing relationships through guanxi is time 
consuming because it involves giving favors by offering short and long term rewards (Westwood and 
Chua, 1992) and maintaining and nourishing the guanxi over time (Yeung and Tung, 1996). 
Moreover, short term goals may have caused contracting parties to feel that the time required to 
develop relationships is not worthwhile, especially when the potential for future relationships is low, 
given that new public projects are subjected to open competition. 
 
Among the 23 possible barriers, Australian respondents indicated only 1 that is a significant barrier 
to adopting RC — public sector accountability concerns (D2). Transparency International (2012) 
ranked Australia and China's corruption perception at 8 (score 8.8) and 75 (score 3.6) respectively, 
where a country that is ranked first is the least corrupt country and a score of 0 means that a country 
is perceived as highly corrupted and 10 means very clean. The vast difference in perception of 
corruption may explain why public sector accountability is upheld as an important tenet in Australia. 
It is suggested that open markets that are not rife with corruption adopt certain RC practices that 
would not compromise public sector's accountability such as sharing of project information, aligning 




RC is more efficient and effective than strict legal compliance because its cooperative approaches are 
based on the recognition of mutual benefits and win–win scenarios. The aim of this study is to 
conduct a comparative study of drivers and barriers to adopting RC practices in public construction 
projects in a centrally planned economy and an open market economy, represented by Beijing and 
Sydney respectively. A structured questionnaire was used to collect data from contracting parties 
who had been previously involved in public construction projects in these cities. Relationship quality 
among contracting parties was first analyzed to determine the nature of relationships among 
contracting parties in both cities. Further statistical tests were conducted to identify significant 
differences in drivers of and barriers to adopting RC between Beijing and Sydney. 
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The results show that contracting parties' relationships at the inter-personal level, and at the end of 
the projects in both cities are all significantly good (see Table 2). It is acknowledged that respondents 
may be biased and provided positive views of the projects that they were involved in. On the other 
hand, the relationships may be truly good because RC practices were implemented. It was found that 
the inter-personal relations between contractors and consultants in Sydney are significantly better 
than in Beijing. This may be due to Beijing's large construction market having many A/E/C firms, 
making it more difficult for contractors and consultants to have such close relationships as in 
Sydney. 
 
This study found many significant factors that drive the adoption of RC in both Beijing and Sydney 
(see Table 3). The results contribute to knowledge by showing that it is feasible to adopt RC 
practices in public construction projects in an open market economy (represented by Sydney), even 
though these projects are usually subject to a plethora of rules, regulations and institutional 
constraints. Similarly, in a planned economy, contracting parties can leverage on the many drivers 
identified in this study to adopt RC practices. 
 
It was found that Beijing experiences 6 significant barriers while Sydney only has 1 significant 
barrier to adopting RC practices (see Table 4). This research further contributes to knowledge by 
showing that a centrally planned economy faces many barriers to adopting RC practices. The barriers 
are consistent with the government adopting a tight control and playing a big part in directing and 
controlling construction enterprises, causing public officials to lack initiative and empowerment, and 
preferring the status quo. The implication of the findings is that open market economies with low 
corruption are suitable to adopt RC, which requires frank and open communication and a 
collaborative project environment. On the other hand, a centrally planned economy may face some 
barriers in the adoption of RC practices. 
 
The findings contribute to practice by identifying the drivers that are critical for cultivating readiness 
in embracing RC and the impeding factors that need to be overcome before RC practices can be 
implemented smoothly in two different markets. 
 
It is recommended that the Chinese government makes use of its influential and controller position to 
encourage wider adoption of RC by introducing public policies and providing more opportunities for 
firms to work collaboratively. It is suggested that contracting parties in both market structures draw 
lessons from organizations that have successfully implement RC practices. It is further recommended 
that Chinese public clients appoint highly competent representatives to manage their projects so that 
they can be empowered to make right decisions. Instead of only open tenders, China could learn 
from Australia by adopting alliance and serial contracting so as to extend relationships across 
projects. Finally, while it is important to spend time to form and nurture relationships, Chinese 
contracting parties should not over do it because relationships have limitations. For example, it 
cannot be transferred from organization to organization, but reside within individuals. 
 
This study has several limitations. It is acknowledged that the response rate in Sydney was low, 
despite many efforts made to raise it. The research compared two groups of public projects, one in 
Beijing and the other in Sydney, but in reality, it compared the perception of the professionals 
regarding the barriers and drivers that the projects faced in implementing RC practices. Nevertheless, 
the findings should not be negated by this as many other construction management research (e.g. 
Black et al., 2000; Chow et al., 2012; Li et al., 2001) was also based on perception of experts. 
 
The next limitation is that data were only collected from Beijing and Sydney, which may not be 
representative of China and Australia respectively. Hence, the findings need to be generalized with 
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care to the whole of China and Australia. Data were not collected from all across each country 
because the wide geographical spread may mean only a few set of project data could be collected 
from different cities. This may introduce further inaccuracy and bias. 
 
The findings from Beijing and Sydney may be generalized to a limited extent, to other regions that 
operate as a centrally planned economy and an open market economy respectively. It should be kept 
in mind that countries are influenced by their national cultures, just as these findings are influenced 
by distinctive cultures in China and Australia. Also, results may not be representative of China and 
Australia as a whole. For future works, research may be extended to the whole of China and 
Australia, especially in regions that have significant construction activities and also to other countries 
with centrally planned economy and open market economy. A more concrete comparison can then be 
made between countries that operate under these 2 economic systems. Future studies could adopt in-
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